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Abstract 
 
In this paper we develop a model in which students choose their university courses 
according to both investment and consumption incentives. We show that in the private 
problem, the education decisions are inefficient compared to the social optimum. The 
result is driven by the fact that students do not consider an externality of acquiring 
education for investment purposes in the working environment. We show that it is 
possible to design tuition fees in such a way that students acquire the socially optimal 
level of education. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the literature of economics of education, the theory of human capital assumes that investments in 
education directly increase a worker's productivity (Becker, 1993). One aspect that does not emerge 
from the theory of human capital is that education may be acquired in part as a consumption good. 
This can be seen in many ways: 
 
1. University curricula vary widely in the job prospects after graduation. Students are often 
observed choosing majors and courses with low job opportunities. This is not for lack of 
information. A student has a multitude of information about job opportunities in each field 
of study. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the job opportunities associated with 
pursuing an engineering degree are more favorable compared to those of an art degree. 
Interpreting education as a consumption good can help explain the attendance at university 
courses that have weaker job prospects. In the example considered, a student may find 
taking an art course more enjoyable than an engineering course. However, the student faces 
a trade-off based upon their future job prospects when choosing between these two courses. 
2. There is a relationship between income and the education acquired by an individual. This 
relationship refers both to the amount of education acquired and to the choice of curricula. 
In both cases, interpreting education as a consumption good may explain this relationship: 
a. First, the acquisition of education increases with income (Becker, 1967, 1993, 
McMahon, 1976, 1984, and 1991, Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001, Blanden and 
Machin, 2004, Vona, 2011, inter alia). The economic literature offers three 
explanations for this: financial constraints; pre-existing ability differences correlated 
with parental income (due to non-cognitive skills acquired from the environment in 
which a student is raised) and differences in risk aversion, without reaching a 
uniform consensus (Ellwood and Kane 2000, Cameron and Heckman 2001, Carneiro 
and Heckman 2002). The empirical evidence is consistent with the alternative 
interpretation that education may be considered as a (normal or luxury) consumption 
good rather than a pure investment good. 
b. Second, there is a relationship between the choice of courses and the student's 
household income. Parents with lower income levels are more likely to encourage 
their child to choose university courses that are associated with more promising job 
prospects, regardless of the child's preferences. Given this parental pressure, a poor 
student is more likely to choose a university course that can increase her 
opportunities in the job market. There is some evidence supporting this statement. 
Baird (1967), in a study based on a comparative socioeconomic analysis of 18,378 
prospective college students, found that students from higher income homes were 
relatively more concerned with developing their intellect, while students from less 
affluent households were more concerned with vocational and professional training. 
The Baird (1967)'s results are confirmed by Dealney (1998), in which lower income 
students are more concerned about how college will prepare them for a career. 
Trusty et al. (2000) studied the dataset NELS:88 from the 1988 to 1994 panel sample 
of the NELS:88. The sample used represents U.S. students who indicated a specific 
major field of study at postsecondary institution when they were 2 years beyond high 
school. They show that, at the highest level of socio-economic status, increases in 
academic performance resulted in a decrease in the choice of enterprising-related 
majors. Leppel et al. (2001) examine the data based on the 1990 survey of Beginning 
Postsecondary Students (BPS), that follows a group of students who began their 
postsecondary educational careers during academic year 1989-90. They show that an 
increase in socio-economic status of the families of college students would be good 
news for humanities and social science departments, but bad news for education and 
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science and engineering.1 Leppel et al. (2005) exploit the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth in order to examine processes by which students enter lucrative 
fields of study, selective colleges, and lucrative fields within selective colleges. They 
shows that students from families with high socio-economic status have a much 
greater probability of selecting lower income fields. Interpreting education as a 
consumption good may explain this evidence: poor students are more likely to 
choose education with stronger investment characteristics than rich students. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis on educational choices in which education is 
explicitly modeled as a consumption or investment good. The analysis can provide input to the 
design an efficient educational policy. A question that may arise is why university courses that are 
associated with weaker job prospects should be subsidized. Similarly, should tuition fees be the 
same for university courses that differentially affect a student's career? The aim of this paper is to 
address such questions. 
 
We develop a model in which a student acquires education both with consumption and investment 
features. Acquiring education investment has a positive effect on the general productivity in the 
working environment as well as on an individual's productivity (Benabou, 1996). Thus, investment 
in education is associated with a positive externality. However, when a student chooses its levels of 
consumption and investment education, this externality is not taken into account. As a consequence, 
in the private equilibrium a student acquires too little educational investment, compared to the 
social optimum. 
 
The paper considers next possible government interventions in order to reach the social optimum, in 
the form of (i) regulated tuition fees or (ii) regulated levels of education. Our results show that it is 
possible to either manipulate tuition fees or set a minimum level of education in such a way that 
students acquire the social optimum level of education. In the case with regulated tuition fees, this 
result emerges if tuition fees for education consumption are kept at the marginal production cost of 
providing education, whereas the tuition fees for education investment are set below marginal 
production cost. 
 
The paper can provide a theoretical understanding on the empirical literature of heterogeneous 
human capital and heterogeneity in the returns of education. In this strand Antonji et al. (2012) and 
Yamaguchi (2012) provide some recent contributions and new evidence, while and Sanders and 
Taber (2012) offer a review of the literature. 
The paper offers a theoretical support to policies in favor of STEM (science, technology. 
engineering and mathematics) education. An example of such policies is the 2007 “America 
Competes Act” (P.L. 110-69), which responds to concerns that the United States may not be able to 
compete economically with other nations in the future due to insufficient investment today in 
STEM education and workforce development, and it is intended to increase the nation's investment 
in STEM education from kindergarten to graduate school and postdoctoral education. The act 
authorizes funding increases for the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of 
Science. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows 
the difference between a private and a socially optimal equilibrium. Section 4 considers possible 
                                                 
1
  Both the NELS:88  and the BPS were conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. 
Department of Education. 
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government interventions, in particular either (i) the design of optimal tuition fees or (ii) the 
introduction of a minimum (optimal) level of education investment. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Students differ in ability θ  and household income 0Y . We denote the distribution of θ  as ( )θG , 
assumed to be continuous and positive on the support [ ]θθ ,0∈ , with density function ( )θg , 
whereas the joint distribution on student type ( )0,Yθ  is continuous and given by ( )0,YF θ , with joint 
density function ( )0,Yf θ , assumed to be positive on its support [ ] [ ]0,0,0 Y×θ . 
 
There are two periods. In period 0, students attend college. In period 1, they work and obtain an 
income. When students attend college, they decide the amount and type of education they want to 
acquire. The specific feature of this model is that education can be acquired for two different 
reasons: (i) for investment reasons, i.e., education can be acquired for increasing future income, and 
(ii) for consumption reasons. An individual may be interested in a specific topic, they may want to 
acquire glamour by increasing their conversational arguments, they may want to acquire social 
status given by obtaining a college degree, even though this will not improve their future incomes. 
In this view, a student can choose a course because it is interesting, or easier to prepare, even 
though it does not give many job opportunities. 
 
In college, different courses of study present different proportions of these two elements of 
education. This is due for instance to different labour demand for a certain topic (engineers may be 
more required than art experts, or they may be paid better), or to a general interest from a social 
point of view toward other topics (talking about arts, cinema, philosophy, literature may be 
considered in general more interesting that discussing about mathematics). Notice that labelling 
courses is irrelevant for our analysis. In the future, people may find more socially intriguing a 
mathematician than an artist, and labour market may need more philosophers than engineers, and 
still our analysis will hold. 
 
For generality, instead of referring to specific courses, we denote the amount of education acquired 
for consumption as 1e , with unitary tuition fees 01 >t , and the amount of education acquired for 
investment as 2e , with unitary tuition fees 02 >t . We do not put constraints on the amount of 
education to acquire in order to obtain a degree. Even though a degree requires usually a specific 
amount of courses, a student may attend only one year, or keep studying at a master program, or 
attend a short term course, or a summer school. 
 
There is a number of colleges that perfectly compete in the college market. Therefore colleges set 
their unitary tuition fees in such a way as to cover their marginal resource cost, ii ct = , where ic  is 
the marginal resource cost of providing teaching for every course type { }2,1∈i . We assume for 
generality that the marginal resource cost of providing a course of type 1 is the same as providing a 
course of type 2, so that 21 tt = . 
 
Students have a utility function over numeraire consumption 0c , savings s , education consumption 
1e  and education investment 2e : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),lnlnln 011 ykceU ++= − γθα ββ          (1) 
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where ( )ββθ −1
1
ln e  denotes the benefit obtained by consuming education, being increasing with a 
student's ability, y  denotes the future earnings and 0,, >kγα  are the respective weights. In 
particular earnings are given by: 
 
( ) ( ),1112 rsEey ++= − σσσθ           (2) 
 
where ( ) σσσθ 112 Ee −  is income, 1>σ , savings ℜ∈s  (borrowings if negative) are accumulated in 
period 0, r  is interests rate, and 
 
( ) ( ) ., 10012 −− 





= ∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθ dYdYfeE          (3) 
 
Income is increasing in ability and education investment. Following Benabou (1996), we assume 
that each worker's income depend positively on a simple index of human capital of the population. 
Accordingly, highly educated and skilled colleagues will boost the productivity of an individual and 
in turn his/her own income. This interdependence is caught by σ , which measures the elasticity of 
substitution.2  
 
In equilibrium, students maximize their own utility by choosing their amount of consumption 0c , 
savings s , education consumption 1e  and education investment 2e , subject to the budget constraint 
 
( ) ( ) ,2211221100 seeetetcY +++++= ψψ         (4) 
 
where ( )ii eψ  is the time cost of education for every course type { }2,1∈i , and ( ) ( ) 0.'',.' >ii ψψ . 
 
 
3. Private vs social optimum 
 
In this section we investigate the baseline results of the paper. In particular we will compare the 
private equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium occurring with no government intervention, with the 
socially optimal allocation. For every student type ( )0,Yθ , the private problem is: 
 
                                                 
2
 This can be easily seen by remembering that the elasticity of substitution between an individual of type θ  and an 
individual of type 'θ  acquiring educational investment 2e  and 2'e , respectively, is given by 
 ( )






=






=
2
2
2
2
2
2
'
1
'
ln
'ln
e
e
e
e
MTRSd
e
ed
σ
ε  
Simple algebra shows that σε = . 
 6 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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To solve the problem, write the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )[ ].
1lnlnln
22112211001
11
20
1
1
seeetetcY
rsEekceLP
+++++−
+







++++=
−
−
ψψλ
θγθα σσ
σββ
      (5) 
 
The first order conditions with respect to seec ,,, 210  and 1λ  are: 
 
,01
00
=−=
∂
∂ λγ
cc
LP
           (6) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ,0'1 1111
11
=+−
−
=
∂
∂
et
ee
LP ψλβα          (7) 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ,0'
1
1
222111
2
111
2
2
=+−
++
−
=
∂
∂
−
−
−
et
rsEe
Eke
e
LP ψλ
θ
θ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
σσ
σ
σ
      (8) 
 
( )
( ) ( )
,0
1
1
111
2
=−
++
+
=
∂
∂
−
λ
θ σσ
σ
rsEe
rk
s
LP
        (9) 
 
( ) ( )( ).2211221100
1
seeetetcYL
P
+++++−=
∂
∂ ψψλ        (10) 
 
Consider (9), which amounts to: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
.
1
1
11
2
1
rsEe
rk
++
+
=
−
σσ
σ
θ
λ           (11) 
 
Substituting (11) into (8) and obtain 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
,0
1
'1
1
1
11
2
222
11
2
111
2
=
++
++
−
++
−
−−
−
−
rsEe
etrk
rsEe
Eke
σσ
σ
σσ
σ
σσ
σ
σ
θ
ψ
θ
θ
σ
σ
      (12) 
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( ) ( ).'1
1
222
111
2 et
r
Ee ψθ
σ
σ σσ
σ
σ
+=
+
−
−
−
         (13) 
 
Condition (13) shows that the discounted marginal benefit equals marginal cost today. Consider 
next (6), which amounts to 
 
.
0
1
c
γλ =             (14) 
 
Plugging (14) into (7) yields: 
 
( ) ( ),'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
          (15) 
 
according to which the marginal benefit of consuming education equals marginal cost. Therefore 
the levels of education acquired in the private case are 
 
Proposition 1. For every ( )0,Yθ  student, the individually optimal levels of education in equilibrium 
are Pe1  such that: 
 
( ) ( ),'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
          (16) 
 
and Pe2  such that: 
 
( ) ( ).'1
1
222
111
2 et
r
Ee ψθ
σ
σ σσ
σ
σ
+=
+
−
−
−
         (17) 
 
Notice that 0c  is function of household income 0Y , in particular γ
0c
 can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( )( )
.
221122110
γ
ψψ seeetetY ++++−
        (18) 
 
Differentiating the L.H.S. of equation (16) with respect to 0Y  yields 
.01
01
>=
∂∂
∂
γYe
LP
           (19) 
 
This shows that the choice of education consumption depends on households income, and in 
particular Pe1  is higher the higher the 0Y . Conversely, equation (17) depends on a student's ability 
but not on her household's income. Finally, by equating: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
1
1
221122110
11
2
1
seeetetY
rsEe
rk
++++−
=
++
+
=
− ψψ
γ
θ
λ
σσ
σ
     (20) 
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and solving for s yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )
( )( ) ,11
1
11
2221122110
rk
EeeeetetYrk
s
++
−+++−+
=
−
σσ
σ
θγψψ
     (21) 
which is the amount of savings in equilibrium. 
 
We turn now to consider the social problem and characterize Pareto efficient allocations. Let 
( ) 0, 0 >Yθω  denote the weight on student ( )0,Yθ ’s utility in the social welfare function, and let 
( ) ( )( )000 ,, YTYT θθ  denote the planner's monetary transfer to household ( )0,Yθ  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0000000 ,,,, dYdYfYTdYdYfYT θθθθθθ ∫∫∫∫  the total transfer to students in time 0 (1). The 
following condition, representing the government balanced budget, must hold: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0,,
1
1
,,,,
000
000000220011
=
+
+++
∫∫
∫∫∫∫∫∫
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYTdYdYfetdYdYfet
θθθ
θθθθθθθ
    (22) 
 
The social planner chooses consumption ( )00 ,Yc θ , savings ( )0,Ys θ , amount of education 
consumption and investment ( )01 ,Ye θ  and ( )02 ,Ye θ , and balanced-budget transfers ( )00 ,YT θ  and 
( )0,YT θ  so as to maximize the social welfare function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) 00001100210 ,,lnlnln,,,,,, dYdYfYTykceYTTeescW θθθγθαθω ββ∫∫ +++= −   (23) 
 
A solution of the problem is Pareto efficient for any social welfare weights ( )0,Yθω . If a Pareto 
improvement were feasible relative to any solution, then the objective function would increase with 
the change, so that a contradiction would emerge. As the social weights vary, alternative Pareto 
efficient allocations are determined, since as one moves along the Paretian frontier the slope 
changes, which serve as social welfare weights corresponding to the particular Pareto efficient 
allocation. If the utility possibilities set is convex, then all Pareto efficient allocations are a solution 
to the problem for some set of weights.3 Therefore the social planner's problem is 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












=
+
+
++
++++=






=
++=
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
∫∫
−
−
−
0,,
1
1
,,
,,
,
,
1..
,,,,,
0000000
00220011
00221100
1
00
1
2
11
2
0210
,,,
max
210
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfet
YTseecY
dYdYfeE
rsEeyts
TTeescW
seec
θθθθθθ
θθθθ
θψψ
θθθ
θ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
 
 
                                                 
3
 If the utilities possbilities set is not convex, then one can still find all Pareto efficient allocations as extrema of the 
planner problem (Panzar and Willig, 1976). 
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The Lagrangian function is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .,
,,
1
1
,,
,,
,
,,1ln,
,lnln,
1
00
1
23
0000000
002200112
002211001
000
11
20
000
1
10














−
+

+
+
++
+++++−
+
















+++
++=
−
−
−
−
∫∫
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
ββ
θθθλ
θθθθθθ
θθθθλ
θψψλ
θθθθθω
θθγθαθω
dYdYfeE
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfet
YTseecY
dYdYfYTrsEekY
dYdYfceYLW
     (24) 
 
For every ( )0,Yθ  type, the first order conditions with respect to 210210 ,,,,,,,, λλTTEseec  and 3λ  
are: 
 
( )
,0, 1
0
0
0
=−=
∂
∂ λγθω
c
Y
c
LW
          (25) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,0'1, 12111
1
0
1
=+−
−
=
∂
∂
te
e
Y
e
LW λψλβαθω        (26) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ,0'
,1
1
,
11
2
1
322221
0
11
2
111
2
0
2
=−+−
+++
−
=
∂
∂ −−
−
−
−
σ
σ
σσ
σσ
σ
σσ
σ
σ
θλλψλ
θθ
θ
σ
σθω eEte
YTrsEe
EkeY
e
LW
 (27) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,0
,1
1,
1
0
11
2
0
=−
+++
+
=
∂
∂
−
λ
θθ
θω
σσ
σ
YTrsEe
rkY
s
LW
       (28) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ,0,
,1
, 300
0
11
2
11
2
0 =+






















+++
=
∂
∂
∫∫
−
−
−
λθθ
θθσ
θθω
σσ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
dYdYf
YTrsEe
EekY
E
LW
   (29) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,0,,
1
,1
,
000
2
0
11
2
0
=
∂
∂
+
+
+++
=
∂
∂
∫∫
−
dYdYfYT
Tr
YTrsEe
kY
T
LW θθθλ
θθ
θω
σσ
σ
   
    (30) 
 
( ) ( ) ,0,, 0000
0
21
0
=
∂
∂
+=
∂
∂
∫∫ dYdYfYTTT
LW θθθλλ        (31) 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ),, 00221100
1
YTseecYL
W
θψψλ ++++−=∂
∂
       (32) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,0,,
1
1
,,
,,
0000000
00220011
2
=
+
+
++=
∂
∂
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfetL
W
θθθθθθ
θθθθλ
     (33)  
 
( ) ( ) .0, 100
1
2
3
=





−=
∂
∂ −−
∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθλ dYdYfeE
LW
       (34) 
 
Begin by noting that (25) amounts to: 
 
( )
,
,
0
0
1
c
Y γθωλ =            (35) 
 
Whereas(31) amounts to: 
 
,21
0
λλ −==
∂
∂
T
LW
           (36) 
 
and finally (30) amounts to: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
.
,1
,
1
0
11
2
02
YTrsEe
kY
r θθ
θωλ
σσ
σ
+++
=
+
−
−
        (37) 
 
We substitute (37) into (29), yielding: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ,0,
1 300
11
22
=+
+
−∫∫
−
−
λθθ
σ
θλ σ
σ
σ
σ
dYdYfEe
r
       (38) 
 
which, given ( ) ( ) 100
1
2 ,
−
−






= ∫∫
σ
σ
σ
σ
θθθ dYdYfeE , it can be rearranged as: 
( ) ,01 3
11
2
=+
+
−
−−
λ
σ
λ σ
σ
σ
σ
EE
r
          (39) 
( ) .1
1
2
3
r+
=⇒
σλ
λ
           (40) 
 
Consider now (27). Plugging (37) into (27) gives: 
 
( ) ( ) .0'
1
1
111
2322221
111
2
2
=−+−
−
+
−
−
−
−
−
σσ
σ
σσσ
σ
σ θλλψλθ
σ
σλ EeteEe
r
     (41) 
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By substituting (36) and (40), and dividing all for 2λ  yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) .01'1
1
111
2
222
111
2
=
+
+−−
+
−
−
−
−
−
r
Ee
te
r
Ee
σ
θψθ
σ
σ σσ
σ
σσσ
σ
σ
       (42) 
( ) ( ).'1 222
111
2 et
r
Ee ψθ
σσ
σ
σ
+=
+
⇒
−
−
         (43) 
 
Consider now (26). Substituting (36) into (26) yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) .'1, 111
11
0 te
e
Y
+=
− ψλ
βαθω
         (44) 
 
Plugging (25) into (44) amounts to: 
 
( ) ( ).'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
          (45) 
Therefore the levels of education acquired in the social optimum case are 
 
Proposition 2. For every ( )0,Yθ  student, the socially optimal levels of education in equilibrium are 
We1  such that: 
 
( ) ( ),'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
          (46) 
and We2  such that: 
 
( ) ( ).'1 222
111
2 et
r
Ee ψθ
σσ
σ
σ
+=
+
−
−
          (47) 
 
It can be easily ascertained that the social optimum is identical to private optimum for educational 
consumption, given the condition for Pe1  and We1  in Propositions 1 and 2. Conversely, the difference 
in benefit between the private and social optimum case is given by 
 
( ) ,1
111
2
22 r
Ee
e
L
e
L PW
+
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−
−
σ
θ σσ
σ
σ
          (48) 
which represents the benefit that a student obtains through the externality. The foregoing results can 
be summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 3. For educational consumption, the private and social optimum coincide. For 
educational investment, the private optimum has lower 2e  than in the  social optimum. 
 
The result is explained by the presence of the externality in the productivity, given by education 
investment. Unlike the social planner, the private individual does not take that into account in her 
education decision. Also, even though the education acquired for consumption is the same in the 
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private and socially optimal case in absolute terms, this is in fact too high in the private case 
relatively to the level of education acquired for investment. 
 
Finally notice that the weights of student types ( )0,Yθω  do not play any role in the social optimal 
level of 2e . This is due to the fact that 2e  is a pure investment good, so that no redistribution is 
necessary in order to make students reach their optimal level of 2e . 
 
4. Government intervention 
 
4.1. The design of optimal tuition fees 
 
In this section we allow tuition fees to be different according to whether education is acquired for 
consumption or investment. In order to obtain different tuition fees, the government introduces a 
subsidy to education investment: 
 
( ) ( ) ,, 2211222*200*0 WWWW etetememTYT ++−−≡θ        (49) 
 
( ) ( ),,, 00* YTYT θθ ≡            (50) 
 
where *2m is the per unit subsidy to education investment. The private problem becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












=
+
+
++
++−−++++=






=
++=
+++
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
∫∫
−
−
−
−
0,,
1
1
,,
,,
,
,
1..
,lnlnln
0000000
00220011
2211222
*
200221100
1
00
1
2
11
2
0
*
0
1
1
,,,
max
210
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfet
etetememYTseecY
dYdYfeE
rsEeyts
YTykce
WWWW
seec
θθθθθθ
θθθθ
θψψ
θθθ
θ
θγθα
σ
σ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
ββ
 
 
To solve the problem, write the Lagrangian function (the superscript R stands for “regulated”): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .,,
1
1
,,
,,
,
,1lnlnln
0000000
002200112
2211222
*
2002211001
0
11
20
1
1


+
+
++
+++−−++++−
+







+++++=
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
−
−
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfet
etetememYTseecY
YTrsEekceL
WWWW
R
θθθθθθ
θθθθλ
θψψλ
θθγθα σσ
σββ
   (51) 
 
the first order conditions with respect to 10210 ,,,,,, λTTseec  and 2λ  are: 
 
,01
00
=−=
∂
∂ λγ
cc
LR
           (52) 
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( ) ( ) ,0'1 12111
11
=+−
−
=
∂
∂
te
ee
LR λψλβα         (53) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ,0'
,1
1
22
*
2221
0
11
2
111
2
2
=+−−
+++
−
=
∂
∂
−
−
−
tme
YTrsEe
Eke
e
LR λψλ
θθ
θ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
σσ
σ
σ
    (54) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,0
,1
1
1
0
11
2
=−
+++
+
=
∂
∂
−
λ
θθ σσ
σ
YTrsEe
rk
s
LR
       (55) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,0
1
,1
2
0
11
2
=
+
+
+++
=
∂
∂
− r
YTrsEe
k
T
LR λ
θθ σσ
σ
       (56) 
 
( ) ( )
,0
,,
0
0000
21
0
=
∂
∂
+=
∂
∂ ∫∫
T
dYdYfYT
T
LR θθθλλ        (57) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ),, 2211222*200221100
1
WWWW
R
etetememYTseecYL ++−−++++−=
∂
∂ θψψλ    (58) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,,
1
1
,,
,,
0000000
00220011
2
=
+
+
++=
∂
∂
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
dYdYfYT
r
dYdYfYT
dYdYfetdYdYfetL
R
θθθθθθ
θθθθλ
     (59)  
 
Begin by noting that (52) amounts to: 
 
,
0
1
c
γλ =             (60) 
 
(57) amounts to 21 λλ −= , and (56) amounts to: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.
,1
1
0
11
2
2
YTrsEe
k
r θθ
λ
σσ
σ
+++
=
+
−
−
        (61) 
 
Consider now (54). Plugging 21 λλ −=  and (61), equation (54) is: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) .'1
1 *
2222
111
2 met
r
Ee
−+=
+
−
−
−
ψ
σ
θσ σσ
σ
σ
        (62) 
 
Consider now (53). Substituting 21 λλ −=  into (53) yields: 
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( ) ( ) .'1 111
11
te
e
+=
− ψλ
βα
          (63) 
 
Plugging (60) into (63) amounts to: 
 
( ) ( ) .'1 111
1
0 te
e
c
+=
− ψβα
γ
          (64) 
 
Comparing (27) with (54) yields: 
 
,0
22
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
e
L
e
L RW
           (65) 
 
for 
 
( ) .1
111
2*
2
r
Ee
m
+
=
−
−
σ
θ σσ
σ
σ
           (66) 
 
Notice that *2m  equals the marginal benefit obtained by the externality. The foregoing discussion 
can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. There exists *2m  such that the social optimum is reached in educational investment. 
 
Proposition 4 shows that it is possible to replicate the social optimum in education decisions by 
manipulating tuition fees in such a way that tuition fees for education investment are subsidized. 
 
4.2 Regulated levels of education 
 
In this section we assume that the government imposes regulated levels of education, without 
altering tuition fees. First, we consider the case in which the government sets a minimum level of 
education investment that students need to acquire in order to obtain a college degree. We denote it 
as Mee 22 ≥ , where the superscript M stands for “minimum”. In particular, the government sets as a 
minimum the socially optimal level. Since this is higher than the amount that the private level of 
education investment in the private equilibrium, none of the students will acquire more education 
investment than We2 , so that the constraint will be Wee 22 = . Therefore an individual’s problem 
becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )












−=
+
+++++=






=
++=
++
−
−
−
−
−
−
∫∫
222
111
2
2211221100
1
00
1
2
11
2
0
1
1
,,,
'
1
,
1..
lnlnlnmax
210
te
r
Ee
seeetetcY
dYdYfeE
rsEeyts
ykce
WW
W
seec
ψθ
ψψ
θθθ
θ
γθα
σσ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σσ
σ
ββ
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The last constraint is the condition from Proposition 2 such that Wee 22 = . To solve the problem, 
write the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )( ) .'1
,
,1lnlnln
222
111
2
2
0022112211001
0
11
20
1
1










−−
+
+++++++−
+







+++++=
−
−
−
−
te
r
Ee
YTseeetetcY
YTrsEekceL
W
M
ψθλ
θψψλ
θθγθα
σσ
σ
σ
σσ
σββ
    (67) 
 
the first order conditions with respect to 0c  and 1e  are: 
 
,01
00
=−=
∂
∂ λγ
cc
LM
           (68) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ,0'1 1111
11
=+−
−
=
∂
∂
et
ee
LM ψλβα         (69) 
 
Notice that (68) amounts to 
0
1
c
γλ = . By substituting into (69) yields 
 
( ) ( ),'1 111
1
0 et
e
c ψβα
γ
+=
−
 
That is the social optimum level. The ongoing discussion can be summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose the government introduce a minimum level of education investment 
WM ee 22 =  as a requirement in order to obtain a college degree. Then the minimum level on 2e  would 
induce efficiency. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have analyzed a model in which students choose their university courses according 
to both investment and consumption intentions. We have shown the presence of an inefficiency in 
the education decisions, and the way to solve the inefficiency through the design of optimal tuition 
fees being differentiated according to the intrinsic characteristics of a university course. Although 
the paper's aim was limited to show this specific inefficiency, the approach considered may suggest 
a new perspective on the design of education policies. 
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